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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
FOUNDATIONS OF MICROECONOMICS INCLUDING A MODEL 
OF MARX'S MICROECONOMICS 
WERNER LEINFELLNER 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
Foundations of a discipline, e.g. economics, means to lay bare meta-or 
,pitheoretically the presuppositions in form of protomodels or paradigms or 
. ackground knowledge together with the methodologically important hy-
°utheses or principles which may be expressed by axioms dealing with a part ~f the discipline or the total field. The description of the protomodels such as. 
Ideological presuppositions, political views, religious and metaphysical basic 
ideas together with their influence on the discipline is often called 
hermeneutics, whereas the latter methodological foundation has to prove that 
the whole discipline can be derived classically - deductively or prob-
abilistically - from the. given axiom, a task which is especially interesting 
if the discipline consists of well formed hypotheses or theories. The first 
typically methodological step consists in singling out similar hypotheses and 
theories of discipline, i.e. dealing with the same field (D). In such a sense the 
differences between macroeconomic theories, such as theory of money, of 
income and price level and microeconomic theories such as resource 
allocation, theory of markets, of firms and households dwindle down, if we 
characterize macro- as well as microeconomics according to J. St. Mill, H. 
Sidgewick, A. Smith, K. Marx as based on a common field D, namely on 
economic preferences, values as well as actions and decisions. Elimination of 
"economic" to avoid circularity, leads to the epitheoretical statement: 
ESl: Macro- and microeconomic hypotheses and theories are preoc-
cupied or may be reduced to the investigation of evaluative processes and/or 
to decision making dealing with creation of values by labor (production) 
comparison, exchange, distribution and possession of creative (produced) 
values. 
A. Smith, K. Marx, L.v. Mises, Rodbard and the Austrian school of 
economics saw in value creation, not in production of goods, the crucial 
problem of economics. This seems to be a withdrawal to the onetime 
occasional title of economics as "the science of values" without being 
concerned with the factual demand of economic decisions. This definition 
would certainly be too wide for our purpose, since we have restricted the 
basis of economics to "value creating actions" which is equivalent according 
to A. Smith and K. Marx to "productive labor." The following explication by 
ES2 may be regarded as a protomodel or paradigm in the sense of Kuhn, in 
the light of which we have to understand economics. We will call this 
paradigm the protomodel of value creative actions and describe it epitheoret· 
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ically by reformulating Rodbard's praxeological foundation of economics. 
ES2: The protomodel of value creation consists of the folIowin 
presuppositions: All economic actions are defined as purposeful individua~ 
evaluative behavior which may serve for decision making under risk and 
uncertainty and are based on production, exchange and distribution of values 
if the following conditions are fulfilled: ' 
2.1 Actions require an image of a desired state (end), a technological plan 
and/or procedure to arrive at this end. 
2.2 Desired ends presuppose that the future state is more satisfactory for the 
individual as well as for his society. 
2.3 More satisfactory states can only be achieved by value creating means. 
Means are the created manufactured goods or factors of production 
(artificially produced by man's labor or available from nature). 
2.4 The means to achieve the desired ends are always scarce. 
2.5 The ranking of final ends as well as the means to achieve desired ends 
change according to the changing efforts, time and technical (technological) 
procedures constantly developed. 
The whole paradigm 2 boils down to the primitive model that things which 
are momentarily scarce have to be created, realized. The realization, creation 
of an end product or good gives the final end product a value, i.e. creates 
values. 
It seems that man in and within his society is not primarily striving for 
maximization of his utility or satisfaction, but tends to produce, create n.ew 
goods which are scarce. 2.3 and 2.4 replace therefore the utilitarian 
maximization of utility. 2.4 introduces at the same time a minimal Pareto 
condition. 
Marx's version can easily be obtained from ES2. 
ES3: If in a protomodel described in ES2 values can only be created by 
labor, then it is called a Marxian protomodel of economics. Marx's version is 
therefore a restriction since it does not take into account that, e.g., exchange 
distribution of values has to be considered at least as value changing, i.e. 
increasing or decreasing the labor value. 
In a next step the neo-utilitarian version of the protomodel ES2 will be 
described. 
ES4: A neo-utilitarian protomodel of microeconomics is obtained if we 
add the following conditions to the primitive model described in ES2: 
4.1 Evaluations and decisions can only be done by individuals (agents) which 
decide rationally, i.e. by using a well formed conventionally established 
decision or value theory prescribing how to evaluate and to decide in a formal 
sense. 
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~.2 More satisfactory decisions are obtained only by maximization of the 
agents' expected utility, or simply of his utility. 
II demands that interpersonal utility has to be established between decision 
makers partaking in a common decision procedure. From 2.2 it follows that 
any compromises (e.g. minimax strategies) are permitted. It should depend 
completely on the reader and economist which one he regards - ES2, ES3 or 
[S4 -' as his protomodel, paradigm in the sense of Kuhn or simply as 
background knowledge on which the economic theories are founded. 
Finally, to conclude the foundations by laying bare the methodological 
presuPpositions of microeconomics, a model M will be discussed by means of 
an axiomatization published in extended form by the author elsewhere. From 
this axiomatized model both the neo-utilitarian version and the Marxistic 
version of microeconomics can be obtained. 
ES5: The basic structure M=(G,N,E,Y;v,p)c is called a set theoretical 
model of microeconomics, which will be defined simultaneously with its 
empirical interpretation if and only if the following structural (methodologi-
cal) epiconditions are fulfilled: 
Cl: G is a finite non-empty set of goods, consisting of three categories: the 
raW materials (RG), the means of production (MG) and the end products of 
the production process (PG), where rg f RG, mg f MG, pg f PG. 
C2: N is a finite non-empty set of individuals, forming groups, coalitions, 
societies, e.g., Firms: Ni f N. 
C3: Y is the set of values defined by a value function on RG, MG and PG, for 
example, by a monetary value-function. 
C4: A is a set of actions, consisting of single actions ail ' a~, ... a~ of ~he ~ -
the decision maker (i=I,2, ... n) and consisting of a set ot actions aJ ,aJ , 
. I 2 
... alm for the j-th decision maker G=1 ,2, ... m). 
C5: v is a general value and choice function of first and second order defined 
on G and N whose values are the elements of the set Y. 
C6: p is a probability function, a measure of the uncertainty of the random 
events E, but also of G or A, on which economic evaluations and decisions are 
depending. 
C7: vC(MG+RG) is a monotonically increasing function called cost function. 
C8: vP called the price function is a monotonically decreasing function given 
for the producer i and his end products pgi by the law of supply and demand: 
pgivp(pg1+pg2+, ... pgn) = YP 
C9: yp is called the profit-value and is given by: y P = YP - yC or 
yP = pgivp(pg1+pg2+, ... pgn) _ vC(mgi+rgi) 
This axiomatization adds to ES2 the cost function, price function and the law 
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of supply and demand. 
Marx called yP profit, yP exchange value or price on the market and yC 
labor value, what we today call the costs. 
With respect to C9 the Marxian in terpretation and the neo-utilitarian 
differ. ES4 regards the profit as the motor of all business and economy since 
it satisfies in an ideal way the maximization of individual utility (See ES4). 
In Marx's interpretation (ES3) the profit is regarded as a surplus value 
not created by labor (therefore called dead labor value). Marx has to applicate 
his socio-political protomodel of classes together with his dialectic proto_ 
model of development to explain C9. Consequently the neoutilitarian (e.g. 
Keynes) regards economy as self regulating, because of the law of supply and 
demand (C9), but Marx has to impose planning control, which he deliberately 
takes from its socio-political model, since he abandoned the supply and 
demand structure of the market, (see ES3). 
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